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The Honorable John C. Backlund, Judge, Presiding. 
The City of Orem, Plaintiff, represented by Michael G. Barker.. 
The defendant, Kristy R. Jensen, represented by Randy Lish 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Should the Court overturn the jury's guilty verdict because the Prosecution 
failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime 
of retail theft? 
Standard of review: "'To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support 
[a] jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of 
the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict."' State v. Hopkins, 380 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah 1999). 
Once the defendant has met the marshaling requirement, the defendant must show "the 
evidence and its inferences are so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted."' State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983)). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602. Retail theft, acts constituting. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 28, 1998, Defendant was cited for the crime of Retail Theft. R. at 2. She 
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was subsequently charged by information with one count of Retail Theft. R. at 1. On 
October 13, 1998, a jury found Defendant guilty of retail theft. R. at 28. 
Defendant and her daughter entered the Albertson's store at 1600 North State 
Street in Orem at approximately 10:00 a.m. on April 28, 1998. Tr. at 20-21, 78. 
Defendant proceeded to the customer service booth where she spoke with an Albertson's 
employee by the name of Susan Olsen (hereinafter "Olsen"). Tr. at 21. Their 
conversation centered on Defendant's desire to exchange a mascara that she thought she 
had purchased at this particular Albertson's. Olsen told Defendant to go select the item 
for which she wished to exchange the mascara. Olsen did so and returned with a 
Bonnebelle Liplight (hereinafter "Liplight"), as well as a few grocery items in her cart. 
Tr. at 22-24, 41. 
Olsen was not sure about the exchange, so she requested assistance from an 
assistant manager, Josh Quarnberg (hereinafter "Quarnberg"). Tr. at 25. Quarnberg 
approached the customer service booth. He noticed Defendant was there and had a cart 
with a few groceries in it. Tr. at 41. Quarnberg spoke with Defendant about the 
exchange. He indicated to Defendant she didn't purchase the mascara at that particular 
Albertson's because that store did not stock Revlon products. Defendant was pretty sure 
she had purchased the mascara at that particular Albertson's but then suggested she may 
have purchased it Allen's, which is located a short distance up State Street. Tr. at 43-44. 
Quarnberg indicated to Defendant that he could not authorize the exchange 
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because the mascara was not purchased at that particular Albertson's. Tr. at 43. 
Quamberg testified that Defendant was not happy Quamberg would not authorize the 
exchange and requested Quamberg authorize that exchange anyway. The conversation 
between Quamberg and Defendant lasted a few minutes. T. at 48. 
Unable to make the exchange, Defendant put the mascara in her purse and put the 
Liplight in the bottom of her cart. She left the customer service booth and walked over to 
the magazine stand. Quamberg followed her from behind and to the left. Defendant 
stopped at the magazine stand so that the magazines were between her and the customer 
service booth. She than walked to the side of her cart so that she was facing the customer 
service booth. Quamberg was in a position to see her and observe her actions. Tr. at 49-
50, 67. Defendant was unaware that Quamberg was watching her. Tr. at 68. 
Quamberg observed Defendant reach into her cart, pick up the Liplight, place it in 
her purse and then pull out her wallet. These actions took only a couple of seconds. 
Defendant then proceeded to one of the checkstands. Tr. at 50-51. Quamberg then 
moved to the customer service booth so he could see whether Defendant would pay for 
the Liplight. Tr. at 53-54. Seeing that Defedant failed to pay for the Liplight in her 
purse, Quamberg and Olsen stopped Defendant as she was leaving the store. Tr. at 57. 
At that point, Quamberg told Defendant he was stopping her because she had 
failed to pay for the Liplight concealed in her purse. Without saying a word, Defendant 
pulled the Liplight out of her purse and handed it to Quamberg. Tr. at 57-58. Quamberg 
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and Olsen escorted Defendant to an office in the store. Tr. at 59. Quarnberg testified 
Defendant never denied she intended to steal the Liplight. Tr. at 69-71. 
At the close of the evidence Judge Backlund instructed the jury. R. at 12-27, Tr. at 
102-103. Both parties presented closing arguments and the jury retired to deliberate. Tr. 
at 105. The jury returned after deliberating and the verdict of guilty was read. Tr. at 106. 
Judge Backlund then polled the jury and all affirmed their verdict remained guilty. Tr. at 
106-107. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has failed to properly marshal the evidence. Defendant has only 
presented those facts most favorable to defendant's position without citations to the 
record. Alternatively, there was sufficient evidence on which to convict defendant of 
retail theft. 
ARGUMENT 
L DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND HAS, 
THEREBY, WAIVED HER RIGHT TO CLAIM THERE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT HER AT TRIAL. 
In making a claim of insufficiency of evidence to support the jury's verdict, the 
Defendant has the burden of marshaling the evidence to support her claim. Case law is 
clear that the Defendant "'must marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and 
then must show this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."' State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 966 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah Ct App. 1992)). 
Furthermore, the defendant's failure to properly marshal the evidence acts: as a waiver of 
the insufficiency of evidence claim. Gallegos at 1189. See State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 
738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) the Court relused to consider 
defendant's claim of insuffient evidence because defendant had failed to properly marshal 
the evidence. As in Scheel, Defendant's brief is "devoid of any mention of the evidence 
supporting the verdict." Id at 473. Rather, Defendant's brief recounts a version of the 
facts most favorable to Defendant while ignoring the evidence that supports the jury's 
verdict. 
IL THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A JURY TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT. 
Assuming, arguendo, Defendant has properly marshaled the evidence, the 
evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom support the verdict. According 
to U.C.A. §76-6-602: 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be 
carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or 
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the intention of 
retaining such merchandise or with the intention of depriving the merchant 
permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without 
paying the retail value of such merchandise; or 
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Defendant claims there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find her guilty. In 
support of her argument, Defendant relies on comments made by the judge regarding the 
difficulty one encounters in sitting in judgment and concludes the Court was 
uncomfortable with the verdict. Judge Backlund's comments are not evidence and this 
Court should disregard them. Parenthetically, whether or not Judge Backlund felt the 
verdict was wrong, he did deny Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment Or In The 
Alternative For A New Trial. 
Defendant then cites facts from the record and draws inferences therefrom 
supporting her position but clearly ignore the other evidence that supports the verdict. In 
other words, Defendant wants this Court to "sort out what evidence actually supports] the 
findings. Scheel at 473. 
On the other hand, the City presented evidence to prove each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It remains undisputed that Defendant concealed some merchandise 
held out for sale by Albertson's. Defendant entered the store to exchange a defective 
mascara. She met with two store employees, including an assistant manager. The 
assistant manager told Defendant she could not exchange items because she had not 
purchased the mascara at that particular Albertson's. Upset, she then proceeded to the 
magazine stand and stopped her cart in a position where she could not easily be seen by 
the employee at the customer service desk. Unbeknownst to Defendant, the assistant 
manager was in a position to see her actions. While stopped at the magazine, Defendant 
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put the Liplight in her purse. 
The real issue before the jury was intent. The evidence was sufficient for the jury 
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly concealed and carried 
away the Liplight with the intent to permanently deprive Albertson's of the item. Intent 
can be inferred from the Defendant's actions. She positioned her cart near the magazine 
stand so that her actions could not easily be seen. She only took a moment to conceal the 
item and then proceed to the checkstand so a jury could reasonably conclude she did not 
forget she had the Liplight. Her hands were not full when she retrieved her wallet from 
her purse, thereby necessitating her placing the Liplight down. Finally, she never denied 
stealing the item even though she had ample opportunity to explain her actions. The jury 
inferring intent from her actions was reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to properly marshal the evidence. Instead of citing the 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then showing the marshaled evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict, Defendant only cites facts and draws inferences 
therefrom supporting her conclusion there was insufficient evidence to convict her. 
Even if the Court holds Defendant did marshal the evidence, the evidence before 
the jury was not sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that Defendant commited the crime of which 
she was convicted. See Scheel at 472. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of December, 1999. 
Michael G. Barker 
Orem City Prosecutor 
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